Ideas and Realities of Emotion (International Library of Psychology)

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Researchers have applied Schwartz's ; theory of basic values to explain individual differences in many domains and cultures. Schwartz, Torres, and Tamir propose a model arguing that the emotions people desire reflect their value priorities, and test this model in 8 countries. Sagiv and Roccas discuss direct and indirect mechanisms that link values to behavior.

These mechanisms include value accessibility, relevance to the situation, and moderation by personal attributes, situational factors, and the cultural context. Each of these studies contributes to our understanding of the ways that value priorities affect important aspects of everyday life. Whittier College, United States of America; 2. Universidad del Magdalena, Colombia; 3.

Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany; 5. University of Ioannina, Greece; 8. Universidad de Salamanca, Spain; 9. Meiji Gakuin University, Japan. Findings were very similar for men and women, and fairly consistent across countries, as well as between individuals who were or were not in an intimate relationship.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel; 3. These findings held even when controlling gender, age, and experienced emotions. The findings suggest that observed gender differences in values can explain gender differences in desired emotions. By covering the entire circle of values, this study offers a framework that can explain desired emotions, in general, rather than a theory that accounts for the desirability of one or two particular emotional states.

More broadly, the framework helps to explain why people differ in the emotions they want to feel. Lilach Sagiv 1 , Sonia Roccas 2 1. The Open University of Israel, Israel. Recent years have seen a growing body of research that links values to behaviors in a variety of life domains. To date, relatively little is known about the mechanisms through which values predict behavior. Direct relationships are affected by the relevance of a given value to a situation and by its chronic and temporal accessibility.

We exemplify these with recent findings of the role of conformity and benevolence values in organizational settings. Discussing indirect mechanisms, we point to personal attributes, situational factors and cultural contexts that serve as moderators of the relationships between value and behavior. University of Brasilia, Brazil; 2. Emotions inform people about states of the world. Because values are conceptions of desired states of the world, we hypothesized that the more people endorse certain values, the more they desire emotions that are consistent with these values.

We expected that the pattern of relations between values and desired emotions to be similar across cultures despite cultural differences in the values their members prioritize and in the emotions they desire. We offer an account of the value bases of a broad range of emotions in contrast to prior research. We teste the hypotheses using hierarchical linear modeling, controlling gender, age, and experienced emotions. TS Studying criminal justice through psychology: Judgments, interrogation, and death penalty.

The presenters are engaged to analyze written judgments, the records of interrogations, investigation reports that were taken from real criminal cases, judicial decision making, and social attitudes towards punishments. The first presenter will introduce the outline of this session. The second presenter is presenting related linguistic theories used in analyzing criminal investigation records and written judgments. He is also presenting the relationships between psycholinguistic analyses and pure linguistic studies.

The third presenter is showing some results from his experimental studies based on the findings obtained through prior presenters' researches. The last presenter is presenting his data on the factors affecting social attitudes towards death penalty and criminal justice. The discussant will review those findings, and discuss their significance among legal psychological studies and future directions of those researches.

Syugo Hotta 1 , Koichi Hioki 2 1. Deciding whether trademark is registrable or not is largely a matter of cognition. Lay people scarcely know how our mind works in recognizing trademarks. The same is true of most triers of fact, whether judges or jurors. However, a substantial number of trademark cases are decided intuitively by those triers without recourse to experts.

Linguistics as well as psychology is a science that theorizes the mechanism of cognition. Our research will help the triers of fact decide how a given mark should be recognized. In this paper, we will delve into the mechanism of recognition of trademarks, especially in such phenomena as dilution and genericide. Koichi Hioki 1 , Syugo Hotta 2 1. School of Law, Meiji University, Japan. As to the Japanese interrogation process, there is a criticism that some interrogators believe that their task is to get the suspect to confess.

In this study, we investigated the difference in interrogative communication styles between directions of interrogation. Participants were given a criminal case scenario and asked to imagine a situation in which they were interrogating a suspect. Their task was to select 10 questions from 30 items and decide their priorities.

At the same time, we manipulated the direction of interrogation in three conditions e. The results showed that in all conditions most participants would use explicit questions e. This report analyzes the survey data collected from Japanese adults in October about their attitude toward the capital punishment system. This conservative attitude was not influenced by any assumption that life imprisonment would be introduced as an alternative to the death penalty, suggesting that Japanese people support the existing system specifically.

They conclude that keeping violent prisoners alive is a waste of money, a view common in other countries maintaining the death penalty. Organizers: Kaori Karasawa 1 , Kazushisa Todayama 2 1. Nagoya University, Japan. Both social psychology and philosophy analyze the structure of concepts which play a key role in determining the perception of the social world and the course of social behavior.

Such concepts include the freewill, causality, responsibility, the self, and the mind. In this session, we discuss the prospects of establishing a new field of "Concept engineering" as a collaborative work of social psychology and philosophy. The major thrust of this field is to explore the methodology for designing or refining i. Social psychologists have recently begun to explore people's concept of free will. These studies, along with previous research e.

On the basis of these evidence, we present a model of how people think about free will and how their beliefs function in social lives. Our experimental studies on free will and moral responsibility, along with recent empirical studies, suggest that these two mechanisms might not be consistent with each other.

This is where we need some conceptual engineering of our concept of free will. In this presentation, I will illustrate what kind of revision is necessary for our concept of free will. For instance, people often ascribe mind to even a nonhuman target i. Social psychology has revealed how people understand the mind and agency. Although some scholars suggest that those findings inform philosophical issues, it has not been made clear how and why it could be the case.

This will be largely because of the fundamental difference in the interests between those two disciplines; while social psychology tries to figure out the descriptive issue of how people understand agency, the philosophical question has been just about the nature of agency, which has normative implication of how people should understand it c.

However, the significance of the psychological findings appears intelligible if we look at how philosophers have implicitly exploited the setup of human psychology. In this talk, I will illustrate such philosophical methodologies working in the free will debate, especially what I call the principle of "worth wanting". Toyo university, Japan; 2. Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea. Although adversity is a universally unwelcoming event, how people respond to one's own and other people's adversity differs across cultures.

In this symposium, we first address how the Japanese and the Koreans cope with their personal adversities in the context of social exclusion and ostracism. We discuss implications of our findings in terms of similarities and differences in individuals' selfhood in the two cultures.

Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea; 2. Toyo University, Japan. Social exclusion is a negative life event as it frustrates basic human needs. However, how people respond to such a threat may vary across cultures. We examined cultural differences in the consequence of ostracism between Korea and Japan through the lens of subjective vs. We conducted a laboratory experiment involving college students in Korea and Japan and found support for our hypothesis, i.

Toyo University, Japan; 2. Social exclusion threatens one of the most fundamental social motives of humans, i. Unfortunately, social exclusion is common in various social relations, and thus people often need to cope with such a negative life event. Coping with social exclusion is a daunting task, but depending on how people cope with it, some positive outcomes such as personal growth are also likely.

We examined the effects of active coping vs. Active coping refers to a tendency to take active steps to cope with a negative experience, whereas positive reinterpretation refers to a tendency to reinterpret and find positive aspects of the negative experience. Results revealed that active coping had positive effects on recovery from social exclusion, while positive reinterpretation did not have such an effect.

Toyo University, Japan; 3. Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea; 4. Toyo University, Japan; 5. Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea; 6. Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea; 7. Differences in expressing emotions between the East and the West have well been documented. Nevertheless, more research is needed as there exist differences even among the Eastern countries. For example, although Japan and Korea are geographically close to each other, Japanese and Koreans are known to have differences in their cultural display rules, i.

In this presentation, we review psychological studies conducted in the two countries focusing on the differences in emotional expressions and evaluations of display of negative emotions i.

The Person and the Social Situation

On the basis of the literature review, we propose several research questions related to how people perceive and respond to the adversity of others during an emotional encounter. We also discuss the psychological mechanisms underlying the differences between the two cultures. Reseach suggests that communicating content emotions serves specific functions in various domains of social relations. Nevertheless, little is known as to how different types of emotional displays by the actor affect the observer's responses in different cultural contexts.

Although both are known as collectivistic societies, there exists a large discrepancy between the two in their predominant display rules. We conducted a laboratory study and found that in Japan a subtle expression of sadness symbolizing suppression i. In contrast, Koreans did not distinguish the two forms of sadness expression, leading to an equal degree of social support for the actor. We discuss implications of our findings and future directions.

TS Collaborative work for Justice and Fairness in Japan: social stratification, interpersonal relationship and deliberation. Fairness research has examined how people get fairness perception from the percepective cognitivism However, this view of fairness or justice has not focused on fluctuating aspect of fairness judgment as social decision making. People has same cognitive foundation, but their judgements differ from one another. We, therefore, need to arrange them in interaction as collaborative work.

The second presenter will present the process of collaborative achievement of fairness in homemaking between couples. Third presenter will show the more complex collaborative achievement of justice, through the deliberation process between professional judges and citizens in the criminal justice system of Japan. The present study aims to explore how individuals and couples achieve harmony and fairness in performing family work.

We conducted interviews with individuals performing family work with their partner, and analysed how individuals and couples perform, share and negotiate the way of performing family work. To keep their life going and to be comfortable in life, they needed to adjust the way of performing family work when their life environment changed. The adjustments were not only for achieving harmony in performing family work in life with the partner and family members but also for themselves living as an individual person.

We describe and discuss how individuals negotiate, collaborate and adjust their way of performing family work with their partner and life environmental changes. Importance of the informational justice for collaborative achievement of the social fairness. From the view of theoretical and historical psychology, psychological concepts such as personality, intelligence and fairness are not understood as an entity of individual mind, rather the one in relation to social environment. In a conflict situation in particular, whether or not people can achieve a fair solution is based on what kind of and how much information is given to stakeholders.

If fairness in society should be achieved in collaboration and interaction with the involved parties each other, all related information also should be given to the stakeholders who are involved in those conflicts. However, if informational divides between stakeholders exist or partial information is given to each party, the situation also will raise a new conflict.

This presentation will show the problems of the "informational justice" in the context of Japanese society. Then, we will discuss how psychologists can address and contribute to this issue. The effect of contact to information about social issues on a sense of micro level fairness in Japan. Social inequality is one of the important social problems in contemporary Japan. It is revealed that while many Japanese regard Japanese society as unfair in macro level, they think they are treated fairly in micro level.

In this study we hypothesized that contact to information about social issues would have negative indirect effect on a sense of micro level fairness via a sense of macro level fairness H1 , whereas it would have direct positive effect on a sense of micro level fairness because people feel relieved to know that there were people who were in worse conditions than themselves H2.

As the results of the social surveys we conducted in Japan, both hypothesis were generally supported. However, the effects of contact to information about social issues on both levels of fairness varied depending on respondents' socioeconomic status. We discuss the way people maintain their own sense of fairness. Analyzing the deliberation process in the mixed jury trial in Japan, from the collaborative aspect in the fairness achievement. Deliberation process in the criminal trial is a dialogue between community members to decide what is fact of the crime event, and it is also the process of group decision making to show what is justice and fairness achieved as decision by the community.

Since , Japan adopted the mixed jury system. Therefore, the six citizens and three professional judges join this process and decide the fact and justice. Basing on the frequency of words in the deliberation, result showed the different their opinion. However they need to decide a fact, in spite of their different opinion about the case. It is only the necessary conclusion as a social decision making rather than finding truth.

A psychology of the film

Each speaker will present the overview of a newly developing research paradigm together with a few examples of major findings, and will discuss possible implications of how the new findings and theories will inform our understandings of human behavior in social dilemmas and how the social dilemma problem can be resolved. Social order beyond such small communities has been established through creation of various social institutions, of which the most critical is the rule of the law.

Solving the social dilemma is an adaptive problem; our evolved psychology contains the solutions. Social dilemmas pose an evolutionary conundrum; how can selfish genes result in cooperative behavior? The answer after decades of research is clear: selfish genes solve the social dilemma only by finding profits that their competitors cannot. Across several studies my collaborators and I have shown how simple elements of the ancestral hominid ecology that the world was large relative to our ability to navigate it, that the future of any interaction was uncertain, that gains in trade are possible and life is potentially long, that groups change composition over time can lead to evolved psychologies that reliably cooperate in social dilemmas and punish those who do not, and do so without any form of group selection.

While social dilemmas present inherent risks, this research suggests our evolved psychology is designs to take the bet that there are even larger rewards. Employing data from thirty expatriates' interviews, it is revealed that expatriate sports clubs act as conduit for social inclusion in a host country.

The social networking between expatriates and host country nationals HCNs develops social harmony and learning. The expatriate sports clubs helps and facilitates expatriates in diluting the confines of identity during their early phase of expatriation. Overall, this study opens a new avenue and contributes to stakeholders approach in expatriate adjustment literature.

Through sports activities organizations could develop team cohesion and inclusion climate among expatriates and HCNs. Lubna Ahmed 1 , Aspasia Paltoglou 2 1. When addressing how we judge the emotional state of others the focus traditionally has been on processing emotions via facial expressions.

Whilst faces are a prime source of emotive information, other visual information, such as body language can also influence emotional state judgments Downing et al. In Experiment 2 we manipulated cognitive load and directed attention to assess if identifying emotions from the face and body vary or are equally important. Since cliques is defined as a small group of friends who select each other in an interlocking network and spend considerable and exclusive time with each other, this study is conducted by interviewing a clique consists of 7 persons with age 19 on average.

The results show that better performing and norming formation are conducted after conflicts happened. Better performing happened after they plotted the task based on individual's mastery and by the time they understand each other. Norming were formed after they had in a big trouble and do storming on it. OR The relationship between ethical judgment and unethical behavior: The moderating role of internal locus of control.

Nasrin Arshadi 1 , Solmaz Hazaryan 2 1. Synchrony seems to be omnipresent not only in physics atomic but also social world. Prior research on synchronicity puts much effort in exploring how synchrony affects our unintentional behavior and implicit social interaction. A more concrete definition and effect of a synchronous movement are yet to be explored further.

Therefore, this study examined the effect of synchrony in explicit movement on social judgment. Participants were then required to rate the closeness for each pair. Synchrony is supported as an effective social cue which also explains marching practice in disciplinary forces.

The purpose of the present study was to understand intergroup behaviour of Hindu and Muslim adolescents through the analysis of religious identity and prejudice. Assessments were made of religious identity and prejudice with the help of scales developed by an international team for use in a number of cultures. Findings revealed that both the Hindu and Muslim adolescents displayed a fairly strong religious identity, although the strength of religious identity of Muslim adolescents was greater than that of the Hindu adolescents.

These findings suggest that identity, especially of adolescents, needs to be defined also in terms of other factors besides religion or community affiliation. Key words: Religious identity, intergroup relations, groups, adolescents, prejudice. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands. Living abroad implicates contacts with the dominating cultural outgroup, the local people. The sample was split into six groups based on participants' adaptation and contact scores. The low adaptation image was rated by independent judges as significantly less positive than the moderate and high adaptation images, while the moderate contact image was rated as significantly less attractive than the low and high contact images.

Elirea Bornman 1,2 , Johan C Mynhardt 1,2 1. University of South Africa, South Africa; 2. University of South Africa, South Africa. South African society offers one of the most profound examples of negative intergroup relations in recent history. Analysts describe South African society as complexly plural and deeply segmented on the basis race, culture, class, historical background, language and religion.

Interest in South African race relations has been enhanced by the tumultuous struggle against apartheid. It has been expected that the advent of a new democratic dispensation in would result in improved interracial relations. It is based on the results of two countrywide surveys conducted by Unisa students.

Measures of future perceptions and attitudes towards various societal groups were included. Multivariate analyses of variance and path analyses were conducted to establish the relationships between variables. Implications of the results for intergroup relations in South Africa is discussed. Kimberly S Bowen 1,2,3 , Yukiko Uchida 2 1. In Japan, participants higher interdependence receive less support and only in higher stress compared to U. This study assessed blood pressure and social interactions over two days among Japanese and U.

Japanese participants received less emotional and informational support, but were no different from U. These findings highlight the need to study alternate support types that are normative as helping behaviors across cultures. As a diverse society, Indonesia possesses unlimited potential for the development of an indigenous approach. However, various challenges exist in actualizing the development of Indigenous Psychology. This study aims to illustrate the challenges faced by one of the prominent pioneers of Indigenous Psychology in Indonesia, the Faculty of Psychology Universitas Gadjah Mada.

A qualitative approach was employed, where eight senior lecturers were chosen to be interviewed through purposive sampling.

The findings show that the challenges in developing indigenous psychology can be categorized into two main groups: individual such as lack of confidence towards indigenous approaches , and institutional such as the need to optimize existing networks. Keyword: Challenges, indigenous psychology. OR Norms influence differently adolescents' risky vs. VeDeCom, France. Normative influence on behaviors is a complex question given all the existing different kinds of norms. Thus not taking risks is different from acting safely at the motivational level, this result could be useful when designing prevention interventions.

Consumers who are exposed to GM food view it as a risky product and have poor acceptance. The model assumes that attitude towards GM is affected by GM perception, trust in information source, uncertain risk tolerance, and purchasing intention is affected by attitude and former purchasing habit.

By regression analysis of valid questionnaire, three results are as follows. Firstly, GM perception contains three factors: benefit, risk and harm perception. There are significant differences among different genders, majors and political status in the GM perception and attitude. Secondly, benefit perception, risk perception, harm perception, trust in expert and uncertain risk tolerance significantly influence the attitude towards GM food and the key factor is benefit perception. Finally, attitude and purchasing habit significantly influence purchasing intention, in which attitude's effect is greater.

Based on previous theories, avoidant coping and coping inflexibility were proposed as underlying psychology mechanisms that accounted for the positive relationships between Internet addiction and psychosocial maladjustment. Moreover, its indirect effects via coping flexibility and avoidant coping were also statistically significant.

An identical pattern of findings was obtained for the prospective data, except only avoidant coping mediated the path from Internet addiction to Time 2 psychosocial adjustment but not coping flexibility. OR Promoting Interaction as a mediator between classroom goal orientation and students' intrinsic motivation.

Classroom goal orientation often determines the achievement of the students in the academic settings. Past researches have documented and described different patterns of adaptive and maladaptive behaviour, the mastery and performance oriented. However, it is not known how classroom goal orientation influences the intrinsic motivation of the student. The present research examined the mediating effects of promoting interaction in the classroom between classroom goal orientation and the intrinsic motivation of the students.

The result did not yield any support for promoting interaction as a mediator between classroom goal orientation and students' intrinsic motivation. It does not support the results and suggestions of the previous researchers. This research has highlighted on the need for systematic investigation on the link between classroom goal orientation and students' intrinsic motivation by identifying a mediating variable. This paper describes results of an empirical study aimed at understanding the decision making process of Americans who emigrate from the U.

Demographic data was collected for each person and with their permission tape recordings of the interview responses were analyzed for emergent themes and reports of common experiences. Results of the analysis highlight the role of personal identity in acclimating to the adopted country. This was most apparent for American expats who happened to be members of ethnic and racial minority groups, but it was also relevant to the experiences of majority group American expats as well. Among other things, findings from this study advance theoretical understanding of the emigration process in general and the decision making process of American expatriates in particular.

Social class shapes individual psychological experiences. This social class difference was expected to be mediated by the individual's personal sense of control. Results of mediation analyses for each of the problem attributions fully supported the hypotheses. Implications for research on social class, attributions and possible behavioral outcomes are discussed.

OR Prefer traits of warmth, competence, or moral when describe self and others? It depends on context. What's more, participants always preferred higher warmth in different contexts. The functional role of social cognition was discussed. Those who were survivors in Chuetsu, were also helped by people from Nishinomiya City, who survived the Kobe Earthquake. This paper focuses on the possibilities of extending PFN volunteerism following a disaster through simulation. Donghui Dou 1 , Xiaocen Liu 2 1. Capital Normal University, China. Study1 found that secondary eating behaviors associated with lower construal level score.

Study 2, consistent with Study 1, found that individuals with lower construal level score showed higher discount rate in a money delay gratification task. OR Blameworthy omissions, causality, and normative expectations: What omissions can teach us about moral responsibility. Both questions invite to consider complex interactions between concepts of agent causality, intentionality, blameworthiness, and obligation.

We present new empirical data showing that the more the agent is seen as possessing knowledge about potential negative outcome and having an ability to prevent the outcome, the more it is likely that obligation to act will be perceived. Ascriptions of causation, blame and intentionality also follow the same pattern. Furthermore, perception of obligation to act mediates ascriptions of blame. This supports our claim that it makes little sense to talk about omissions outside the context of normative expectations.

OR The comparison on death attitude of the staff, people coming to see a doctor and the family of the patients with terminal cancer in a community hospital. Based on previous research suggesting that death attitude is influenced by many things such as gender, age, education and religion and there is a lack of consistency in various results about the theme, this research explores the effects of age as well as life experience on the attitude of death.

The results shows that the general death attitudes of the three groups are alike while there is a significant difference on each dimension, suggesting that death attitude is influenced by age,but the effects of age is regulated by life experience about death. OR Stop labeling them as sensitive issues A qualitative exploration of Malay Muslim students perspectives on interfaith engagement in Malaysia. Elaine Fernandez 1 , Adrian Coyle 2 1.

Kingston University London, United Kingdom. Although Malaysia is famed for its religious diversity, little has been done to explore how Malay Muslims, the religious majority group, perceive interfaith engagement in the country. This paper presents a qualitative study of Malay Muslim students' perceptions and experiences of interfaith engagement in Malaysia, utilizing data from four focus group interviews with 18 young Malay Muslims in Britain. Thematic analysis yielded three superordinate themes.

These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for the facilitation of religious harmony in a diverse cultural context. In the last decades, Portugal has witnessed an increase of people experiencing homelessness. Despite the reasonable amount of research on homelessness, most of national and international publications focus on the characterization of homeless population, description of survival or living strategies in the streets and its political and social implications. The sample consisted of homeless individuals, men and 27 women, 20 to 70 years old.

Loneliness scores correlated significantly and negatively with life satisfaction. Implications for social and psychological intervention with people experiencing homelessness will be discussed. The white wedding has been a traditional affair, which transmits with its preparations and celebrations stereotypical gender norms. The Ten Eurocentric, white, heterosexual, newlywed couples formed the participants for the research study.

The predominantly South African participants were interviewed and the interviews transcribed verbatim. These texts were analysed using Parker's steps to discourse analytic reading. Throughout the analysis specific discourses emerged, which served the purposes and intentions of the couples. Two studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that knowing how most people in the community view a certain moral event would shift individuals' emotional reactions to the event in the direction of the descriptive norms.

In Study 1, after participants had indicated their emotional reactions, they received bogus feedback on most people's reactions to the events. The results showed that bogus feedback weaken the intensity of anger reaction when the participant's response was an unpopular response. In Study 2, participants received bogus feedback on other people's moral concerns for the same events. OR Reconsidering cultural competence development as a narrative of complex movements: Insights from an investigation into the Australian Indigenous mental health arena. An investigation of the tensely contested arena of Australian Indigenous mental health revealed that providers and recipients of service navigate their involvement in ways that permit their avoidance or approach of destabilising paradoxes invoked as a consequence of unsettled service delivery contexts.

Instead, the investigation highlighted the reality that cultural competence within the arena is often contextually fragile and socially specific. This presentation outlines the broad investigation and discusses the emergence of a conceptual framework upon which examples of the complex movements employed by participants within and external to the arena are examinable. Its implications for pedagogy, and the conceptualisation of cultural competence and teacher praxis are also considered. A scale was developed to define the psychometric properties of social awkwardness.

The scale assesses the factors of what consists of social awkwardness. This understanding, which now prevails among philosophers and psychologists who study emotions, represents a recovery of ideas about emotions that were prominent in the thought of the ancients. Indeed, Aristotle is often cited in the expositions of contemporary cognitivist theories of emotion as a source of their central thesis. And the boldest of them go so far as to endorse the ancient Stoic theory on which emotions are taken to be identical to evaluative judgments of a certain kind Solomon, ; Nussbaum, ; see also Nussbaum, , chs.

Most of these theories, however, are less bold and give accounts of emotions that include, as essential elements, other things besides evaluative thought and articulate some complex relation among these elements. Agitation of the mind, autonomic behavior, and impulses to action are the usual additions. But even in these theories evaluative judgment is the primary element in the mix, for it is the element by which each emotion is principally identified.

It is the element the theories principally use to define different types of emotion Deigh, , pp. A theme that is common to these theories is that emotions, like other cognitive states, belong to intelligent thought and action. They are in this respect on a par with beliefs and other judgments, decisions, and resolutions.

They are, that is, states that one can regard as having propositional content, which their subjects accept or affirm. Accordingly, one can treat them as warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified, by the circumstances in which they occur or the beliefs on which they are based. Thus, fear would be warranted if its object evidently posed some threat to one and unwarranted if it evidently posed no threat.

Likewise, anger would be justified if it were a response to a genuinely demeaning insult and unjustified if based on one's mistaking an innocent remark for such an insult. In either case, the emotion is warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified, because the evaluative judgment in which the emotion consists, either in whole or in part, is warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified. In general, then, on these theories, an evaluative judgment is an essential component of an emotion. It is, moreover, the component by which one type of emotion differs from another.

If you want to understand the difference between contempt and anger, say, then according to these theories the difference lies in the type of evaluative judgment that is essential to each emotion. When you have contempt for someone because he has behaved badly, you judge the person to be low or unworthy of your esteem in view of that behavior. When you are angry at someone because he has behaved badly, you judge the person to have injured or insulted you or someone close to you by so behaving. First, sometimes one can experience an emotion toward something that one knows lacks the properties it must have for the emotion to be warranted.

Consider, for example, the fear people typically experience when looking down from a precipice. They may know that they are perfectly safe and in no danger of falling, yet fear falling nevertheless.

Emotions are social

Similarly, common phobias such as snake and spider phobias supply examples of fear of an object the subject knows is harmless. Again, people sometimes feel disgust at foods they know are nutritious, benign, and perhaps even tasty. Yet familiarity with such experiences tells us that when, for example, one feels fear on looking down from a precipice, knowing that one is perfectly safe, one doesn't judge or believe that one is in any danger of falling. To react with fear, it is sufficient that one look down and see the steep drop below. The reaction is automatic, as it were. It does not depend on one's making a judgment or forming a belief about one's circumstances' being dangerous.

Cognitivist theories that fit the standard model cannot, then, satisfactorily account for such fear.

The second objection to the standard model is that it cannot satisfactorily account for the emotions of nonhuman animals and human infants—beasts and babies. Like the first objection, this second objection identifies a class of emotions that resist being understood as consisting either wholly or in part in evaluative judgments of the kind that the standard model identifies as the essential cognitive element in emotions.

The reason for this resistance is plain. Such judgments, like beliefs, are states of mind that imply acceptance or affirmation of propositions. Consequently, to have emotions requires being capable of grasping and affirming propositions. That is to say, one must have acquired a language. Since beasts never acquire a language and babies have yet to acquire one, the standard model cannot account for their emotions. The result is not entirely surprising. The most important antecedent of the standard model, the cognitivist theory of emotions that the ancient Greek and Roman Stoics advanced, denied that beasts and babies ever experienced emotions.

Because beasts and babies lacked language, the Stoics argued, they were incapable of making evaluative judgments of the kind with which the Stoics identified emotions. But their view, like Descartes' cognate view that only human beings have minds, has long since been reduced to an historical curiosity. Consequently, any theory of emotions must acknowledge that beasts and babies are capable of having emotions, and it must account for these as well as the emotions of mature human beings.

Cognitivist theories that fit the standard model fail in this respect. In view of these objections, recent defenders of cognitivist theories have dropped the standard model in favor of a broader account of the evaluative cognition that is essential to emotions see Nussbaum, ; and Roberts, Such cognition, they argue, need not be an evaluative judgment of the kind that implies grasping and affirming a proposition. It may, instead, be a perception. Indeed, some defenders of cognitivist theories now argue that emotions are primarily forms of perception. Since perceiving something does not imply that you make any judgment or form any belief about it, the first objection does not threaten cognitivist theories that fit this model.

When you look down from a precipice, knowing you are in no danger of falling, the fear you experience need not consist in or involve a belief or judgment that you are in danger of falling. You perceive danger in falling, but you do not believe or judge that you are in danger of falling.

Hence, in feeling fear of falling you do not make contradictory judgments or hold contradictory beliefs. And the same goes for other examples that generate the first objection to the standard model. Does the perceptual model also escape the second objection? Can it account for the emotions of beasts and babies?

Defenders of this model maintain that it can. Because perception is sometimes a more primitive form of cognition than the kind of evaluative judgment that the standard model identifies as essential to emotions, they argue, it is possible on the perceptual model for beasts and babies to have evaluative cognitions of the kind that is essential to emotions.

Specifically, because not all perception requires propositional thought, attributing perceptions to beasts and babies does not presuppose that either has any linguistic capabilities. The dog's perception, so defenders of the perceptual model would argue, is like the perception we have when we look at a straight stick partially submerged in a deep pool of water.

We see it as bent. Our so seeing the stick does not require any propositional thought on our part, and by the same token the dog's seeing the man with the stick as dangerous does not require any propositional thought on the dog's part. This argument for recognizing that the perceptual model is beyond the reach of the second objection would succeed if the point of that objection, when pressed against the standard model, were a point about the mode of cognition that on this standard model characterizes the evaluative judgments the model represents as essential to emotions.

It would succeed, that is, if the reason the standard model fails to account for the emotions of beasts and babies is that the model takes such evaluative judgments to be states or acts of mind in which some proposition is p. Some perceptions, after all, are cognitive states in which the mind neither affirms nor denies a proposition.

They are of a different mode of cognition. Hence, the second objection would have no force against the perceptual model since this alternative mode may characterize some of the perceptions the model represents as essential to emotions. But one could be making a different point in advancing the second objection. One could be making a point about the cognitive content of the evaluative judgments that the standard model represents as essential to emotions. In that case, the argument has not succeeded in showing that the perceptual model is beyond the reach of this objection.

For the cognitive content of a perception of someone, the man with the stick, say, as dangerous is the same as the cognitive content of a judgment that this man is dangerous. In either case, the concept of danger is deployed in a cognitive representation of the situation, and to have and deploy a concept of danger is to be capable of propositional thought.

Hence, the perceptual model too runs afoul of the second objection. Defenders of the perceptual model will of course balk at this result. They will argue, in response, either that one does not need to have a concept of danger to see something as dangerous or that it is possible to have concepts even if one has no language or has yet to acquire one.

Neither response, however, rescues the model from defeat by the second objection. Let us consider the second response first. They are, that is, what such words mean when they occur in meaningful sentences. To have concepts independently of one's having a language implies either of two possibilities.

On the one hand, it may imply that one's concepts are innate and part of what takes place, when one learns language, is one's matching words to them and constructing sentences that match the combinations of them one has created. On the other, it may imply that one first acquires concepts through sensory and affective experiences and later learns how they are encoded in language.

The first possibility captures a view of language acquisition according to which it follows and results from the emergence and development of rational thought in children. Since animals other than human beings are not rational and never acquire language, the first possibility is not available to defenders of the perceptual model.

The second possibility treats concepts as ideas in the mind that derive from one's sensory and affective experience. On this possibility, the acquisition of such ideas is not exclusive to human p. At the same time, this possibility entails a semantics for natural language according to which the meanings of our words are these ideas in our minds. Defenders of the perceptual must avoid attributing concepts to beasts and babies if they are to save the model from defeat by the second objection.

We are left, then, with the alternative response, that one does not need to a have a concept of danger to see something as dangerous. With regard to this response, the first thing to ask is what seeing something as dangerous amounts to. Specifically, is it like seeing a straight stick as bent when it is partially submerged in a pool of water?

Or is it more like seeing an extended hand as an offer of friendship when you first make someone's acquaintance? In the latter case, the perception entails an interpretation that consists in applying a concept, the concept of an offer of friendship, to a gesture. So if seeing something as dangerous is like this latter case, then the alternative response fails to save the perceptual model. In the former case, the perception, by contrast, arguably need not involve any application of a concept.

In describing our perception as one of seeing a straight stick as bent, we describe how the stick appears to us in circumstances in which we know it would appear differently if we looked at it through a uniform medium. We are thus remarking a sensory property an object appears to have but may not in fact have. It is a property of a kind of which we are directly aware through one or more of our sense modalities. The question, then, is whether being dangerous is similarly a sensory property of objects, whether it is a property of a kind of which we are directly aware through one of our sense modalities.

When one teaches a child words for such properties one assumes prior acquaintance with the properties. That is, one assumes that the child's sense modalities have developed, worked well, and been exercised. When one teaches a child color words, for instance, one finds objects that display the colors vividly, presents those objects to the child, and has it apply the different words to them.

Other objects that are similar in color are also presented to the p. On the assumption, then, that the child can recognize the objects in each group as similar to each other, it is taught to apply the word to what each member in the group has in common with every other. Children are not presented with a collection of objects such as pencils with sharp points, rubber balls, plastic bags, matches, and billfolds and invited to group them according as they are dangerous or benign. One does not assume prior acquaintance with the property.

Otherwise one would naturally teach them what the word means by teaching them to apply the word to what they already recognize as the property the objects have in common. Rather children are taught the meaning of the word by being told which things are dangerous and which are not. Teaching them the meaning and teaching them how to recognize the property are therefore one and the same. One assumes, that is, that the child is ignorant of which things have the property and which do not, that it cannot, without instruction, recognize a thing's being or not being dangerous.

Whether it's strangers or matches or busy streets, a child is taught about the danger each poses, and the teaching typically includes some explanation of the harm that each can cause. Likewise, one teaches a child not to be afraid of things that initially frighten it when they are not dangerous. In so doing, one is not correcting a child's misperception of danger. Rather, one is teaching the child that not everything scary is dangerous, and this teaching too may include a demonstration that these scary things do not cause harm.

If being dangerous were a sensory property, such teaching would be unnecessary for getting children to recognize danger. A method of teaching like that of teaching children the meaning of color words would be sufficient.

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As it is not, we may conclude that being dangerous is not a sensory property. It is not a property of which we are directly aware through one of our sense modalities.

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What then should we say about the dog that is afraid of the man threatening him with a stick? It is tempting, of course, to say that the dog sees the man as dangerous. After all, if a man threatened you with a stick, you would certainly see him as dangerous. But we need not suppose that the dog can perceive the property of being dangerous to understand the dog's fear. We need only suppose that the dog sees the man as an imminent source of pain in that the dog anticipates pain from this man owing, say, to the man's threatening behavior and the dog's having previously experienced being violently struck with a stick.

The previous experience and the perception of the man are jointly sufficient to explain the dog's fear. For having once been traumatized by pain, the dog will anticipate again feeling pain when he is in a similar situation, and consequently the occurrence of a similar situation is bound to trigger fear of the objects in that situation from which he p.

The mechanism is familiar. Think, for example, of the apprehension you experience when a nurse is about to draw blood or administer an anesthetic and you see in her hand a syringe with a long needle. We need not suppose any evaluative cognition to understand the inward shudder you feel as the nurse approaches. And the same is true of the dog. Cognitivist theories of the emotions on which evaluative cognition is essential to emotions have been the predominant theories for the past forty or so years.

The attraction of these theories is the account of the intentionality of emotions they give. The account promises both a way of understanding the relation of an emotion to its object and the orientation toward the object that the emotion affords its subject. Yet they fall short of giving a satisfactory account of the intentionality of the emotions to which beasts and babies are liable.

And since these are the first emotions that men and women who become capable of experiencing emotions whose intentionality does consist in evaluative cognition experience, it would seem that the soundest theory of emotions that proceeds from a concept of emotion on which intentionality is its core element should begin with an account of the intentionality of these primitive emotions and build on it an account of how they are transformed through moral development and education into emotions whose intentionality consists in evaluative cognitions see Deigh, Recently, under the influence of work on emotions in neuroscience, there has been a return to conceiving of emotions as essentially feelings.

Indeed, those in the forefront of this development have invoked James's account as the source of their program. Rather they are also meaningful. One can therefore characterize their account of emotions as a hybrid produced by grafting this idea onto James's account of emotions. This hybrid's distinctive thesis, then, is that the feelings of bodily changes in which an emotion consists are intentional phenomena.

For they will have given a uniform account of the intentionality of emotions, an account that fits equally well the emotions of beasts and babies, on the one hand, and the emotions of men and women, on the other. They will have done so, that is, given that on this hybrid, emotions, whether of beasts and babies or of men and women, consist in feelings of bodily changes and given that their intentionality has the same character in either case. At the same time, there is reason to wonder about the coherence of a hybrid that results from grafting the fundamental idea of the concept of emotion Freud introduced onto James's account.

To begin with, Freud introduced his concept out of an interest in citing unconscious emotions to explain a broad range of human behavior, feelings, and bodily conditions. His point was that an emotion need not be a conscious state to have influence in human lives, and, by identifying intentionality as the core element in our understanding of the nature of emotions, he secured that point. The point is obviously lost, however, when one takes the feelings of bodily changes to be the vehicle of an emotion's intentionality.

Feelings of bodily changes cannot be unconscious. So one may wonder what the point is of their taking intentionality as an essential feature of emotions. Is their doing so just a case of amalgamating two otherwise independent features into a single conception? In addition, Freud's use of a concept of emotion on which intentionality is the core element served to maintain the commonsense view of emotions as springs of action. To grasp an emotion's intentionality is to understand how the emotion orients its subject toward the world or toward certain persons or things in it and what sorts of action to expect in response to that orientation.

James's account is meant to oppose common sense on this point, for, on his account, the actions common sense takes as springing directly from an emotion are among the bodily movements the feeling of which the emotion consists in and therefore cannot be explained by the emotion. Taking emotions, instead, as states of motivation that are distinct from and can give rise to feelings would appear, in view, say, of Hume's doctrine of the calm passions, to make better sense if one did not conceive of emotions as epiphenomena.

A useful starting place is Antonio Damasio's theory of emotions in his influential book Descartes' Error. Damasio draws his theory from his research in neuroscience on the brain. Damasio's research yields a description of the neurological activity that occurs as we confront and respond to new and different situations. His main observation is of neurological activity that signals a need for adjustment or action that will promote one's survival, correct for deviation in one's functioning that threatens one's health, say, or that will restore one to a condition of functioning well.

The signals, in other words, enable us to monitor what is happening in and to our bodies and to make adjustments and take actions as necessary. We are the recipients of these signals, and we use them to regulate our welfare. In setting out his views on the nature of emotions, Damasio expressly claims James's account as their principal antecedent. The feelings of bodily changes that James took emotions to consist in are, according to Damasio, a means by which we monitor what is happening in and to our bodies during an episode of emotion.

They signal the need for us to make adjustments and to take action. Accordingly, Damasio characterizes them as perceptions of the body. In doing so, he renders them intentional phenomena. He therefore offers a way of understanding the intentionality of emotions on James's account.

Damasio, however, despite regarding himself as following James in giving his account of the emotions, does not. Specifically, he does not deploy James's concept of emotion in his theory. If the negative feelings last for an extended time and begin to lead the person to miss work or classes, then they may become symptoms of a mood disorder. It is normal to worry about things, but when does worry turn into a debilitating anxiety disorder?

And what about thoughts that seem to be irrational, such as being able to speak the language of angels? Are they indicators of a severe psychological disorder, or part of a normal religious experience? Another difficulty in diagnosing psychological disorders is that they frequently occur together. Comorbidity occurs when people who suffer from one disorder also suffer at the same time from other disorders.

Every culture and society has its own views on what constitutes abnormal behaviour and what causes it Brothwell, Ancient Hindu tradition attributed psychological disorder to sorcery and witchcraft. During the Middle Ages it was believed that mental illness occurred when the body was infected by evil spirits, particularly the devil. Remedies included whipping, bloodletting, purges, and trepanation cutting a hole in the skull, Figure In France, one of the key reformers was Philippe Pinel , who believed that mental illness was caused by a combination of physical and psychological stressors, exacerbated by inhumane conditions.

Pinel advocated the introduction of exercise, fresh air, and daylight for the inmates, as well as treating them gently and talking with them. Bucke , Charles K. Clarke , Clifford W.

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Beers , and Clarence M. These reformers saw mental illness as an underlying psychological disorder, which was diagnosed according to its symptoms and which could be cured through treatment. Dr Richard Bucke was appointed superintendent of the Asylum for the Insane in Hamilton in and a year later of the asylum in London, Ontario.

He believed mental illness was a failure of the human biological adaptive process. Dr Charles Clarke was an assistant superintendent at the Hamilton asylum in the early s, and later superintendent of the asylum at Kingston, Ontario. By he had changed the asylum from a jail to a hospital and was instructing nurses and attendants in the care of the mentally ill.

Dix was a Massachusetts schoolteacher who wrote, lectured, and informed the public and legislators about the deplorable conditions in mental institutions like those shown in Figure She was successful in influencing a number of state legislatures either to establish or improve their mental institutions, and because of her efforts a mental hospital was built in St. She also lobbied the Nova Scotia legislature and oversaw the building of a hospital for mental patients in that province. He took a psychological approach as opposed to the prominent biological approach that was the custom and introduced new forms of treatments that involved close contact with and careful observation of patients.

Despite the progress made since the s in public attitudes about those who suffer from psychological disorders, people, including police, coworkers, and even friends and family members, still stigmatize people with psychological disorders. A stigma refers to a disgrace or defect that indicates that person belongs to a culturally devalued social group. In some cases the stigma of mental illness is accompanied by the use of disrespectful and dehumanizing labels, including names such as crazy, nuts, mental, schizo, and retard.

The stigma of mental disorder affects people while they are ill, while they are healing, and even after they have healed Schefer, On a community level, stigma can affect the kinds of services social service agencies give to people with mental illness, and the treatment provided to them and their families by schools, workplaces, places of worship, and health-care providers.

While media portrayal of mental illness is often sympathetic, negative stereotypes still remain in newspapers, magazines, film, and television. See the following video for an example. Television advertisements may perpetuate negative stereotypes about the mentally ill. The most significant problem of the stigmatization of those with psychological disorder is that it slows their recovery. People with mental problems internalize societal attitudes about mental illness, often becoming so embarrassed or ashamed that they conceal their difficulties and fail to seek treatment.

Despite all of these challenges, however, many people overcome psychological disorders and go on to lead productive lives. People do not choose to have a mental illness. Second, we must all work to help overcome the stigma associated with disorder. Psychologists have developed criteria that help them determine whether behaviour should be considered a psychological disorder and which of the many disorders particular behaviours indicate.

These criteria are laid out in a 1,page manual known as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM , a document that provides a common language and standard criteria for the classification of mental disorders American Psychiatric Association, The DSM is used by therapists, researchers, drug companies, health insurance companies, and policymakers in Canada and the United States to determine what services are appropriately provided for treating patients with given symptoms.

The first edition of the DSM was published in on the basis of census data and psychiatric hospital statistics. Since then, the DSM has been revised five times. The DSM does not attempt to specify the exact symptoms that are required for a diagnosis. Rather, the DSM uses categories, and patients whose symptoms are similar to the description of the category are said to have that disorder. The DSM frequently uses qualifiers to indicate different levels of severity within a category.

For instance, the disorder of mental retardation can be classified as mild, moderate, or severe. Each revision of the DSM takes into consideration new knowledge as well as changes in cultural norms about disorder. Homosexuality, for example, was listed as a mental disorder in the DSM until , when it was removed in response to advocacy by politically active gay rights groups and changing social norms. The current version of the DSM lists about disorders. Two common critiques of the DSM are that the categorization system leaves quite a bit of ambiguity in diagnosis and that it covers such a wide variety of behaviours.

Zack, aged seven years, has always had trouble settling down. He is easily bored and distracted. In school, he cannot stay in his seat for very long and he frequently does not follow instructions. He is constantly fidgeting or staring into space. Zack has poor social skills and may overreact when someone accidentally bumps into him or uses one of his toys.

At home, he chatters constantly and rarely settles down to do a quiet activity, such as reading a book. But what do the symptoms mean? Does Zack simply have a lot of energy and a short attention span? Boys mature more slowly than girls at this age, and perhaps Zack will catch up in the next few years. One possibility is for the parents and teachers to work with Zack to help him be more attentive, to put up with the behaviour, and to wait it out.

ADHD is a developmental behaviour disorder characterized by problems with focus, difficulty maintaining attention, and inability to concentrate, in which symptoms start before seven years of age Canadian Mental Health Association, In adults the symptoms of ADHD include forgetfulness, difficulty paying attention to details, procrastination, disorganized work habits, and not listening to others. ADHD is also being diagnosed much more frequently in adolescents and adults Barkley, You might wonder what this all means.

Perhaps drug companies are also involved, because ADHD is often treated with prescription medications, including stimulants such as Ritalin. Although skeptics argue that ADHD is overdiagnosed and is a handy excuse for behavioural problems, most psychologists believe that ADHD is a real disorder that is caused by a combination of genetic and environmental factors. Jared is able to maintain eye contact and enjoys mixing with other children, but he cannot communicate with them very well. Here he was tested by a pediatric neurologist, a psychologist, and a child psychiatrist.