Knowledge and Necessity (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol. 3: 1968 9)

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Rousseau and Hegel. Political economists and Hegel, including Smith, Steuart. German idealism and Hegel. Kant and Hegel: general. Kant and the Phenomenology. Kant's epistemology and metaphysics: Hegel's critique. Kant on self-consciousness, apperception and the transcendental deduction: Hegel's critique. Kant's dialectic and antinomies: Hegel's critique. Kant's ethics: Hegel's critique of it in general. Kant's ethics: Hegel's critique of its formalism and so emptiness. Schiller and Hegel. Fichte: texts.

Fichte: collections of shorter works. Fichte: general. Fichte and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Fichte on self-consciousness and intellectual intuition. Fichte's philosophy of right general. Fichte on recognition and the relation of right. Fichte on intersubjectivity necessity of a second self-conscious subject.

Fichte on property. Fichte's ethics. Fichte's distinction between right and ethics. Fichte and Hegel: general. Fichte and Hegel: recognition. Romanticism and Hegel Novalis, Schlegel. Schelling: texts. Schelling: general. Schelling on nature and subjectivity. Schelling on intellectual intuition. Schelling on recognition. Schelling's early systems and Hegel.

Biographies intellectual. Berne and Frankfurt writings Natural theology and the young Hegel. Civil religion and the young Hegel. Progressive theories of history and the young Hegel. Jena writings : general. Jena writings: logic and metaphysics. Jena writings: politics, ethics and religion. Essay on Natural Law Natural law and Hegel. Differenzschrift and Faith and Knowledge. Recognition in Fichte. Life and love in Frankfurt, Jena and the Phenomenology. Love in Hegel's mature writings.

Recognition in Hegel's work as a whole. Recognition in the Jena writings Recognition in the Phenomenology : general. Recognition in the Phenomenology : the role of Fichte. Forgiveness and pardon. Recognition in the Philosophy of Right. Recognition in the Logic. Slavery in Hegel. Recognition and selfhood in Hegel. Recognition and freedom in Hegel. Marx on recognition. Theunissen on Hegel. Siep on Hegel. Honneth on Hegel. Phenomenology : short introductions. Phenomenology : introductory commentaries. Phenomenology : advanced commentaries. Phenomenology: commentaries on particular topics.

Phenomenology : collections. Phenomenology : Preface. Phenomenology : Introduction. Method of the Phenomenology. Immanent critique in Hegel. Transcendental argument and transcendental deduction in the Phenomenology. Scepticism and Hegel, assumptions and foundations of the Phenomenology and Logic.

Immediate knowledge. Structure of the Phenomenology. Phenomenology : chs. Sense-certainty, ch. Sense-certainty: possible parallels to Hegel's argument. Perception, ch. Force and understanding, ch. Infinity in Hegel. Inverted world. Self-consciousness in the Phenomenology. Desire and the body in the Phenomenology. Recognition in the Phenomenology. Master-servant relation. Death in Hegel. Labour in Hegel. Stoicism, scepticism and the unhappy consciousness, ch. Social epistemology in ch. Observing reason. Transition to spirit. Spirit: texts. Spirit: metaphysical interpretations.

Spirit: intersubjective and collective-subject interpretations, and collective intentionality in Hegel. Phenomenology : ch. Coherence of the Phenomenology , phenomenology and history.

Greek world and its inadequacy. Tragedy in Hegel. Legal status Rechtszustand , Roman world, person and property in the Phenomenology. Alienation in the Phenomenology. Enlightenment vs. Modernity and Hegel. French Revolution. Totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and Prussianism in Hegel. Moral and political stance of the Phenomenology.

Phenomenology: ch. Art in the Phenomenology. Absolute knowing and the metaphysics of the Phenomenology , ch. Intellectual intuition in Hegel. Phenomenology and logic, phenomenology and system. Logic : short introductions. Logic : commentaries. Logic : collections. Logic : surveys of the secondary literature. Dialectical method. Logic : method and structure, dialectic, contradiction, speculation, form and content. Logic: formalisations of dialectical logic. Reason, understanding and intuition. Sociality of reason. Proposition judgment , speculative proposition, language.

Being, nothing, becoming. Essence and actuality. Subjective logic. Concrete and abstract universality. Identity and difference in Hegel. Concrete universal in British idealism. Metaphysics of Hegel, his account of the absolute: texts. Metaphysics of Hegel: surveys. Metaphysics of Hegel: theological interpretations: general. Metaphysics of Hegel: theological interpretations: orthodox. Metaphysics of Hegel: theological interpretations: kenotic. Metaphysics of Hegel: theological interpretations: realisationist. Metaphysics of Hegel: immanentist and pantheist.

Metaphysics of Hegel: conceptualist and panlogist interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: epistemist-realist interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: dialogical interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: empiricist-realist interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: positivist and category theory interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: implicitly anti-realist interpretations.

Metaphysics of Hegel: hermeneutical interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: Kantian interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: transformed-Kantian interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: social-Kantian interpretations. Metaphysics of Hegel: historical-relativist interpretations. Relation of Logic to Realphilosophie. Nature and the natural sciences: general. Mathematics and geometry in Hegel. Ecology, environmentalism and Hegel. Nature and the natural sciences: particular topics. Life in Hegel's mature system, plant and animal subjectivity. Subjective spirit: general. Soul and feeling, anthropology.

Consciousness, self-consciousness and the I. Universal self-consciousness. Theoretical spirit, intentionality, imagination. Practical spirit. Madness and Hegel. Politics and ethics: texts. Politics and ethics: short introductions. Politics and ethics: guides. Politics and ethics: fuller commentaries.

Politics and ethics: collections. Politics and ethics: early development. Normative stance, positive right vs. Doppelsatz the rational is actual. Philosophy of Right : method and structure. Philosophy of Right and Hegel's Logic and metaphysics, political theology in Hegel. Hartmann on the Philosophy of Right.

Pippin on Hegel's ethics and political philosophy. Freedom in Hegel: general. Freedom and recognition in Hegel, freedom in ethical life. Freedom and determinism in Hegel. Will and freedom as the basis of the Philosophy of Right: Stern's view. Action and reasons for action in Hegel. Savigny and the historical school of law and Hegel. Duty, desire and feelings in Hegel. Person, property and contract. Human rights in Hegel. Liberalism and individual freedom in Hegel, principle of subjective freedom.

Conscience in Hegel. Ethical life, i. Community and individual, sociality of the self in Hegel, communitarianism and Hegel. Ethical substance: substantialist vs. Social contract theory: Hegel's critique. Feminism and Hegel. Civil society. Bildung and education. System of needs, Hegel and the market, Hegel and capitalism. Class and poverty in Hegel. Law Gesetz , legal theory, Roman law. Contradictions of civil society, police and corporations. State and constitution. Patriotism and political disposition. Democracy and monarchy in Hegel.

War and international relations in Hegel. Republicanism and patriotism in Hegel. History philosophy of : texts. History philosophy of : short introductions. History philosophy of : commentaries. History as progressive, the cunning of reason. History of philosophy. Historical role of Hegel's philosophy. End of history in Hegel. Anarchism and Hegel. Philosophy of religion in general. Kant and Fichte's theology and Hegel. Religion in the Phenomenology. Natural religion. Judaism and Hegel. Christianity in Hegel, Hegel's christology.

Trinitarianism in Hegel. Kenosis and death of God in Hegel. Religion and philosophy in general in Hegel.

Religion and the state. Art and aesthetics. Schellingian critiques of Hegel. Marx and Hegel. Kierkegaard and Hegel. Nietzsche and Hegel. British Idealists or British Hegelians. British idealism: ethical and political thought. Whitehead and Hegel. Freud, Lacan and Hegel. Heidegger and Hegel. French philosophers and Hegel. Bataille and Hegel. Sartre and Hegel. Levinas and Hegel. Marxists on Hegel. Wittgenstein and Hegel. Deleuze and Hegel. Adorno and Hegel. Gadamer and Hegel. Nancy and Hegel. Irigaray and Hegel. Habermas on Hegel. Rawls and Hegel. Lyotard, postmodernism and Hegel.

Derrida and Hegel. Analytic philosophy and Hegel. McDowell on Hegel's metaphysics. Brandom on Hegel. Hegel [s] Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy , tr. Knox and Miller, pp. Hegel [] The Encyclopaedia Logic , tr. Geraets et al. Rockmore, T. Maker, W. Stern, Robert 'G. Hegel' in J. Teichman and G. Schroeder , W. Findlay, J. Mure, G. Lauer, Quentin Hegel's Idea of Philosophy. Rosen, S. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom. Rotenstreich, N.

Taylor, Charles Hegel , 5th ed Hamacher, W. Inwood, Michael Hegel , Arguments of the Philosophers. Berthold-Bond, D. Kainz, H. Hegel: The Philosophical System. Redding, Paul Hegel's Hermeneutics. Wallace, R. Collections on specific subjects are under the relevant headings. Steinkraus, W. Lamb, D. Desmond, W. Hospers, J. Hegel: Critical Assessments , 4 volumes. Deligiorgi, K. Ashton, P. Caird, E. McTaggart, G. Royce, J. Rosenzweig, F. Popper, K. For Hegel's own theory of language see 'Proposition judgment , speculative proposition, language'.

Adorno, T. Petry, M. Solomon, Robert In the Spirit of Hegel , ch. Geraets, T. Burbidge, J. Weiss, F. O' Malley et al. The Legacy of Hegel. Steinhauer, K. The Encyclopaedia Logic , tr. Has an annotated bibliography on the Logic. Harris, H. Avineri, S. Schmidt, J. Lewis, C. Bienenstock, M. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain Ameriks, K. The Owl of Minerva US. Hegel-Studien Germany. Hegel-Jahrbuch Germany. Net maintained by Kai Frobe, Munich.

Hegel Society of Great Britain. Hegel Society of America. The Hegel. These also have secondary literature. Dobbins and P. Fuss Early Theological Writings [Berne, Frankfurt ], tr. Knox , reprinted Harris and W. Cerf Available online: German text. Natural Law [Jena ], tr. Knox Faith and Knowledge [Jena ], tr. Cerf and H. Harris Harris and T. Available online: System of Ethical Life. Burbidge and G. Second Jena system.

Hegel and the Human Spirit [Jena ], tr. Rauch Third Jena system. Available online: English text in part. Phenomenology of Spirit [Jena ], tr. Miller , or in a looser but more readable translation, as The Phenomenology of Mind , tr. Baillie , revised Available online: German text , German text on a single page , Baillie translation , Baillie translation alternative source.

Shannon, Miller, Available online: Section on Phenomenology , Section on Logic. Berlin ], tr. Miller pb, or in 2 volumes, tr. Johnston and L. Struthers Available online: German text part 1 , part 2 , Miller translation extracts. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline [Heidelberg ], tr. Taubeneck Encyclopaedia Logic also known as 'Shorter Logic' [Heidelberg , rev.

Berlin , ], tr. Wallace , reprinted , Available online: German text , Wallace translation.

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Lectures on Logic , tr. Butler, Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Nature [Heidelberg , rev. Berlin , ] as The Philosophy of Nature , tr. Miller , or, in a better translation with the German on opposite pages, in 3 volumes, tr. Petry Available online: German text , Taubeneck translation of edition. Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit [Heidelberg , rev. Berlin , ] as Hegel's Philosophy of Mind , tr. Wallace , republished with additions, tr. Miller pb. Also, with the German on opposite pages and an set of students lecture notes as an appendix, as Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit , 3 volumes, tr.

Petry republished the section on Phenomenology, with the lecture notes interpolated between the paragraphs of Hegel's text instead of the usual additions, as The Berlin Phenomenology Available online: German text , Wallace translation. Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit , ed. Williams, OUP Stewart and P. Hodgson Nisbet pb or as Outlines of the Philosophy of Right tr.

Knox and Houlgate , preferable to the older translations as Hegel's Philosophy of Right , tr. Knox pb, and, tr. Dyde Available online: Knox translation. Sibree , revised , reprinted pb. The introduction is published separately, in much better translations than Sibree's, as Reason in History , tr. Hartman , and as Introduction to the Philosophy of History , tr. Rauch pb; and also in a much fuller version as Lectures on the Philosophy of World History , Introduction: Reason in History , tr.

Nisbet pb. Available online: Sibree translation of introduction. Lectures on Aesthetics [Berlin s], as Hegel's Aesthetics , 2 volumes, tr. The introduction is published separately as Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics , tr. Bosanquet , reissued pb, and also as Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics, tr. Available online: Knox translation of whole text. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [Berlin ], 3 volumes, tr. Hodgson et al. Preferable to the older version, tr. Speirs and J. Sanderson , reprinted Available online: Speirs and Sanderson translation introduction. The version of the lectures extracted from the 3-volume edition.

Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God , tr. Lectures on the History of Philosophy [Berlin 's], 3 volumes, tr. Haldane and F. Simson , reprinted pb. A more accurate version of volume 3 is published as Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The Lectures of Volume 3: Medieval and Modern Philosophy , tr. Brown and J. Stewart The various introductions are translated separately as Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy , tr.

Knox and A. Available online: Haldane and Simson translation selections , alternative source. Hegel: The Letters , tr. Butler and C. Seiler A reasonably complete edition of Hegel's works in German is published by Suhrkamp as Hegel: Werke , 20 volumes pb. For online and CD versions, see www. Harris, tr. Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit , , pp. Available online: German text , English text. Hegel, G. Hegel , ed J. Dubey, V. Herling, B. See also 'Greek world and its inadequacy' and 'Natural law and Hegel'.

Gray, J. Heidegger, M. McNeill ed Pathmarks Another English translation is available online. Riedel, M. Wright Taminiaux, J. De Laurentiis, A. Wilson, J. Rosen, M. Jaeschke, W. See also 'Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel on the forms and categories'. Lectures on the History of Philosophy , section on Plato. Philosophy of Right , references to Plato. Plato, Timaeus. Rose, R. Griswold, C. Wartenberg, T. Vieillard-Baron, J. Ferrari, G. Kraut ed The Cambridge Companion to Plato.

Sembou, E. Lectures on the History of Philosophy , section on Plato's political philosophy. Foster, M. Pelczynski ed The State and Civil Society. Ware, R. With thanks to Vicky Roupa. Lectures on the history of Philosophy , section on Aristotle. Aubenque, P. Santoro-Brienza, L. Wolff, M. Koninck, T. Aubenque, V. Ferrarin, A. Pendlebury, G. See also 'Slavery in Hegel'.

Ilting, K. Pinson, J. Depew, D. Fawes, H. Bull, M. See also 'Christianity in Hegel, Hegel's christology' and 'Hegel's metaphysics: theological interpretations'. Sontag, F. Dickey, L. Also in their relation to Schelling. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy , section on neo-Platonism. Plotinus, Enneads. Proclus, The Elements of Theology. Rist, J. Beierwaltes, W. O'Meara and L. Bieler eds The Mind of Eriugena. Vater, M. Harris ed The Significance of Neoplatonism.

Gottfried, P. O'Regan, C. Schelling's thought', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 4. Souche-Dagues, D. See also 'Boehme and Hegel'. Hanratty, G. Mitscherling, J. Lakebrink, B. Maritain, J. Studien zur Seinskonzeption bei Thomas von Aquin und Hegel. Brito, E. Vieillard-Baron , J. Benz, E. Weeks, A. Magee, G. Magee, Glen A.

Clark and J. Skinner Lichtenstein, E. Beriaschwili, M. Lectures on the History of Philosophy , vol. Haldane, E. Seidman ed. Reynolds and Eunice Paul Vieillard-Baron, J-L. Natural Law , tr. Knox, pp. Brown and Stewart, pp. Strauss, L. Peperzak, Adriaan 'Hegel and Hobbes revisited', in A.

Collins ed Hegel on the Modern World. Buchwalter, A. Spinoza [] Ethics. H Burkhardt. Beck, L. Bell, D. Beiser, F. Walther, M. Including Hegel's debates with those who accused him of atheism and pantheism. Science of Logic , tr. Lectures on the History of Philosophy , tr. Haldane and Simson, vol. So, for example, the sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. Although many philosophers have interpreted, and continue to interpret, Tarski's theory as a deflationary theory , Popper refers to it as a theory in which "is true" is replaced with " corresponds to the facts ".

He bases this interpretation on the fact that examples such as the one described above refer to two things: assertions and the facts to which they refer. He identifies Tarski's formulation of the truth conditions of sentences as the introduction of a "metalinguistic predicate" and distinguishes the following cases:. The first case belongs to the metalanguage whereas the second is more likely to belong to the object language. Hence, "it is true that" possesses the logical status of a redundancy. Upon this basis, along with that of the logical content of assertions where logical content is inversely proportional to probability , Popper went on to develop his important notion of verisimilitude or "truthlikeness".

The intuitive idea behind verisimilitude is that the assertions or hypotheses of scientific theories can be objectively measured with respect to the amount of truth and falsity that they imply. And, in this way, one theory can be evaluated as more or less true than another on a quantitative basis which, Popper emphasises forcefully, has nothing to do with "subjective probabilities" or other merely "epistemic" considerations.

The simplest mathematical formulation that Popper gives of this concept can be found in the tenth chapter of Conjectures and Refutations. Here he defines it as:. Popper's original attempt to define not just verisimilitude, but an actual measure of it, turned out to be inadequate. However, it inspired a wealth of new attempts. Knowledge, for Popper, was objective, both in the sense that it is objectively true or truthlike , and also in the sense that knowledge has an ontological status i.

He proposed three worlds : [59] World One, being the physical world, or physical states; World Two, being the world of mind, or mental states, ideas and perceptions; and World Three, being the body of human knowledge expressed in its manifold forms, or the products of the Second World made manifest in the materials of the First World i. World Three, he argued, was the product of individual human beings in exactly the same sense that an animal's path is the product of individual animals, and thus has an existence and is evolution independent of any individually known subjects.

The influence of World Three, in his view, on the individual human mind World Two is at least as strong as the influence of World One. In other words, the knowledge held by a given individual mind owes at least as much to the total, accumulated, wealth of human knowledge made manifest, comparably to the world of direct experience. As such, the growth of human knowledge could be said to be a function of the independent evolution of World Three.

Many contemporary philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have not embraced Popper's Three World conjecture, mostly due to its resemblance to mind-body dualism. The creation—evolution controversy in the United States raises the issue of whether creationistic ideas may be legitimately called science and whether evolution itself may be legitimately called science. In the debate, both sides and even courts in their decisions have frequently invoked Popper's criterion of falsifiability see Daubert standard. In this context, passages written by Popper are frequently quoted in which he speaks about such issues himself.

For example, he famously stated " Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories. And yet, the theory is invaluable. I do not see how, without it, our knowledge could have grown as it has done since Darwin. In trying to explain experiments with bacteria which become adapted to, say, penicillin , it is quite clear that we are greatly helped by the theory of natural selection. Although it is metaphysical, it sheds much light upon very concrete and very practical researches.

It allows us to study adaptation to a new environment such as a penicillin-infested environment in a rational way: it suggests the existence of a mechanism of adaptation, and it allows us even to study in detail the mechanism at work. He also noted that theism , presented as explaining adaptation, "was worse than an open admission of failure, for it created the impression that an ultimate explanation had been reached".

When speaking here of Darwinism, I shall speak always of today's theory—that is Darwin's own theory of natural selection supported by the Mendelian theory of heredity , by the theory of the mutation and recombination of genes in a gene pool, and by the decoded genetic code. This is an immensely impressive and powerful theory.

The claim that it completely explains evolution is of course a bold claim, and very far from being established. All scientific theories are conjectures, even those that have successfully passed many severe and varied tests. The Mendelian underpinning of modern Darwinism has been well tested, and so has the theory of evolution which says that all terrestrial life has evolved from a few primitive unicellular organisms, possibly even from one single organism. In , regarding DNA and the origin of life he said:. What makes the origin of life and of the genetic code a disturbing riddle is this: the genetic code is without any biological function unless it is translated; that is, unless it leads to the synthesis of the proteins whose structure is laid down by the code.

But, as Monod points out, the machinery by which the cell at least the non-primitive cell, which is the only one we know translates the code "consists of at least fifty macromolecular components which are themselves coded in the DNA ". Monod, ; [62] , [63]. Thus the code can not be translated except by using certain products of its translation.

This constitutes a really baffling circle; a vicious circle, it seems, for any attempt to form a model, or theory, of the genesis of the genetic code. Thus we may be faced with the possibility that the origin of life like the origin of the universe becomes an impenetrable barrier to science, and a residue to all attempts to reduce biology to chemistry and physics.

He explained that the difficulty of testing had led some people to describe natural selection as a tautology , and that he too had in the past described the theory as "almost tautological", and had tried to explain how the theory could be untestable as is a tautology and yet of great scientific interest:.

My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. It raises detailed problems in many fields, and it tells us what we would expect of an acceptable solution of these problems. I still believe that natural selection works in this way as a research programme.

Nevertheless, I have changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation. The theory of natural selection may be so formulated that it is far from tautological. In this case it is not only testable, but it turns out to be not strictly universally true. There seem to be exceptions, as with so many biological theories; and considering the random character of the variations on which natural selection operates, the occurrence of exceptions is not surprising. Thus not all phenomena of evolution are explained by natural selection alone.

Yet in every particular case it is a challenging research program to show how far natural selection can possibly be held responsible for the evolution of a particular organ or behavioural program. These frequently quoted passages are only a very small part of what Popper wrote on the issue of evolution, however, and give the wrong impression that he mainly discussed questions of its falsifiability. Popper never invented this criterion to give justifiable use of words like science.


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In fact, Popper stresses at the beginning of Logic of Scientific Discovery that "the last thing I wish to do, however, is to advocate another dogma" [66] and that "what is to be called a 'science' and who is to be called a 'scientist' must always remain a matter of convention or decision. I do not try to justify [the aims of science which I have in mind], however, by representing them as the true or the essential aims of science. This would only distort the issue, and it would mean a relapse into positivist dogmatism. There is only one way, as far as I can see, of arguing rationally in support of my proposals.

This is to analyse their logical consequences: to point out their fertility—their power to elucidate the problems of the theory of knowledge. Popper had his own sophisticated views on evolution [70] that go much beyond what the frequently-quoted passages say. Popper understood the universe as a creative entity that invents new things, including life, but without the necessity of something like a god, especially not one who is pulling strings from behind the curtain.

He said that evolution of the genotype must, as the creationists say, work in a goal-directed way [72] but disagreed with their view that it must necessarily be the hand of god that imposes these goals onto the stage of life. Instead, he formulated the spearhead model of evolution , a version of genetic pluralism. According to this model, living organisms themselves have goals, and act according to these goals, each guided by a central control. In its most sophisticated form, this is the brain of humans, but controls also exist in much less sophisticated ways for species of lower complexity, such as the amoeba.

This control organ plays a special role in evolution—it is the "spearhead of evolution". The goals bring the purpose into the world. Mutations in the genes that determine the structure of the control may then cause drastic changes in behaviour, preferences and goals, without having an impact on the organism's phenotype. Popper postulates that such purely behavioural changes are less likely to be lethal for the organism compared to drastic changes of the phenotype.

Popper contrasts his views with the notion of the "hopeful monster" that has large phenotype mutations and calls it the "hopeful behavioural monster". After behaviour has changed radically, small but quick changes of the phenotype follow to make the organism fitter to its changed goals. This way it looks as if the phenotype were changing guided by some invisible hand, while it is merely natural selection working in combination with the new behaviour. For example, according to this hypothesis, the eating habits of the giraffe must have changed before its elongated neck evolved.

Popper contrasted this view as "evolution from within" or "active Darwinism" the organism actively trying to discover new ways of life and being on a quest for conquering new ecological niches , [74] [75] with the naturalistic "evolution from without" which has the picture of a hostile environment only trying to kill the mostly passive organism, or perhaps segregate some of its groups.

Raven when, in his Science, Religion, and the Future , , he calls this conflict 'a storm in a Victorian tea-cup'; though the force of this remark is perhaps a little impaired by the attention he pays to the vapours still emerging from the cup—to the Great Systems of Evolutionist Philosophy, produced by Bergson, Whitehead, Smuts, and others. In his later work, however, when he had developed his own "spearhead model" and "active Darwinism" theories, Popper revised this view and found some validity in the controversy:.

I have to confess that this cup of tea has become, after all, my cup of tea; and with it I have to eat humble pie. Popper and John Eccles speculated on the problem of free will for many years, generally agreeing on an interactionist dualist theory of mind. However, although Popper was a body-mind dualist, he did not think that the mind is a substance separate from the body : he thought that mental or psychological properties or aspects of people are distinct from physical ones.

When he gave the second Arthur Holly Compton Memorial Lecture in , Popper revisited the idea of quantum indeterminacy as a source of human freedom.

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Eccles had suggested that "critically poised neurons" might be influenced by the mind to assist in a decision. Popper criticised Compton's idea of amplified quantum events affecting the decision. He wrote:. The idea that the only alternative to determinism is just sheer chance was taken over by Schlick , together with many of his views on the subject, from Hume , who asserted that "the removal" of what he called "physical necessity" must always result in "the same thing with chance. As objects must either be conjoin'd or not, I shall later argue against this important doctrine according to which the alternative to determinism is sheer chance.

Yet I must admit that the doctrine seems to hold good for the quantum-theoretical models which have been designed to explain, or at least to illustrate, the possibility of human freedom. This seems to be the reason why these models are so very unsatisfactory. Hume's and Schlick's ontological thesis that there cannot exist anything intermediate between chance and determinism seems to me not only highly dogmatic not to say doctrinaire but clearly absurd; and it is understandable only on the assumption that they believed in a complete determinism in which chance has no status except as a symptom of our ignorance.

Popper called not for something between chance and necessity but for a combination of randomness and control to explain freedom, though not yet explicitly in two stages with random chance before the controlled decision, saying, "freedom is not just chance but, rather, the result of a subtle interplay between something almost random or haphazard, and something like a restrictive or selective control. Then in his book with John Eccles, The Self and its Brain , Popper finally formulates the two-stage model in a temporal sequence.

And he compares free will to Darwinian evolution and natural selection:. New ideas have a striking similarity to genetic mutations. Now, let us look for a moment at genetic mutations. Mutations are, it seems, brought about by quantum theoretical indeterminacy including radiation effects. Accordingly, they are also probabilistic and not in themselves originally selected or adequate, but on them there subsequently operates natural selection which eliminates inappropriate mutations.

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Now we could conceive of a similar process with respect to new ideas and to free-will decisions, and similar things. That is to say, a range of possibilities is brought about by a probabilistic and quantum mechanically characterised set of proposals, as it were—of possibilities brought forward by the brain. On these there then operates a kind of selective procedure which eliminates those proposals and those possibilities which are not acceptable to the mind. In an interview [33] that Popper gave in with the condition that it should be kept secret until after his death, he summarised his position on God as follows: "I don't know whether God exists or not.

Some forms of atheism are arrogant and ignorant and should be rejected, but agnosticism —to admit that we don't know and to search—is all right. When I look at what I call the gift of life, I feel a gratitude which is in tune with some religious ideas of God. However, the moment I even speak of it, I am embarrassed that I may do something wrong to God in talking about God. Why then should the Jewish myth be true and the Indian and Egyptian myths not be true?

Popper helped to establish the philosophy of science as an autonomous discipline within philosophy, through his own prolific and influential works, and also through his influence on his own contemporaries and students. Popper founded in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and there lectured and influenced both Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend , two of the foremost philosophers of science in the next generation of philosophy of science.

Lakatos significantly modified Popper's position, [85] : 1 and Feyerabend repudiated it entirely, but the work of both is deeply influenced by Popper and engaged with many of the problems that Popper set. While there is some dispute as to the matter of influence, Popper had a long-standing and close friendship with economist Friedrich Hayek , who was also brought to the London School of Economics from Vienna. Each found support and similarities in the other's work, citing each other often, though not without qualification.

In a letter to Hayek in , Popper stated, "I think I have learnt more from you than from any other living thinker, except perhaps Alfred Tarski. For his part, Hayek dedicated a collection of papers, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics , to Popper, and in said, " Popper also had long and mutually influential friendships with art historian Ernst Gombrich , biologist Peter Medawar , and neuroscientist John Carew Eccles.

The German jurist Reinhold Zippelius uses Popper's method of "trial and error" in his legal philosophy. Popper's influence, both through his work in philosophy of science and through his political philosophy, has also extended beyond the academy. Most criticisms of Popper's philosophy are of the falsification , or error elimination, element in his account of problem solving. Popper presents falsifiability as both an ideal and as an important principle in a practical method of effective human problem solving; as such, the current conclusions of science are stronger than pseudo-sciences or non-sciences , insofar as they have survived this particularly vigorous selection method.

He does not argue that any such conclusions are therefore true, or that this describes the actual methods of any particular scientist. Rather, it is recommended as an essential principle of methodology that, if enacted by a system or community, will lead to slow but steady progress of a sort relative to how well the system or community enacts the method. It has been suggested that Popper's ideas are often mistaken for a hard logical account of truth because of the historical co-incidence of their appearing at the same time as logical positivism , the followers of which mistook his aims for their own.

The Quine-Duhem thesis argues that it's impossible to test a single hypothesis on its own, since each one comes as part of an environment of theories. Thus we can only say that the whole package of relevant theories has been collectively falsified, but cannot conclusively say which element of the package must be replaced. An example of this is given by the discovery of the planet Neptune : when the motion of Uranus was found not to match the predictions of Newton's laws, the theory "There are seven planets in the solar system" was rejected, and not Newton's laws themselves.

For Popper, theories are accepted or rejected via a sort of selection process. Theories that say more about the way things appear are to be preferred over those that do not; the more generally applicable a theory is, the greater its value. Thus Newton's laws, with their wide general application, are to be preferred over the much more specific "the solar system has seven planets".

The philosopher Thomas Kuhn writes in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that he places an emphasis on anomalous experiences similar to that Popper places on falsification. However, he adds that anomalous experiences cannot be identified with falsification, and questions whether theories could be falsified in the manner suggested by Popper.

Popper claimed to have recognised already in the version of his Logic of Discovery a fact later stressed by Kuhn, "that scientists necessarily develop their ideas within a definite theoretical framework", and to that extent to have anticipated Kuhn's central point about "normal science". Science must begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices.

The scientific tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers. Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them.

Another objection is that it is not always possible to demonstrate falsehood definitively, especially if one is using statistical criteria to evaluate a null hypothesis. More generally it is not always clear, if evidence contradicts a hypothesis, that this is a sign of flaws in the hypothesis rather than of flaws in the evidence. However, this is a misunderstanding of what Popper's philosophy of science sets out to do. Rather than offering a set of instructions that merely need to be followed diligently to achieve science, Popper makes it clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery that his belief is that the resolution of conflicts between hypotheses and observations can only be a matter of the collective judgment of scientists, in each individual case.

In Science Versus Crime , Houck writes [97] that Popper's falsificationism can be questioned logically: it is not clear how Popper would deal with a statement like "for every metal, there is a temperature at which it will melt. These examples were pointed out by Carl Gustav Hempel.

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Hempel came to acknowledge that Logical Positivism's verificationism was untenable, but argued that falsificationism was equally untenable on logical grounds alone. The simplest response to this is that, because Popper describes how theories attain, maintain and lose scientific status, individual consequences of currently accepted scientific theories are scientific in the sense of being part of tentative scientific knowledge, and both of Hempel's examples fall under this category. For instance, atomic theory implies that all metals melt at some temperature.

An early adversary of Popper's critical rationalism, Karl-Otto Apel attempted a comprehensive refutation of Popper's philosophy. In Transformation der Philosophie , Apel charged Popper with being guilty of, amongst other things, a pragmatic contradiction. Scruton maintains that Freudian theory has both "theoretical terms" and "empirical content.

Nevertheless, Scruton also concluded that Freudian theory is not genuinely scientific. According to Taylor, Popper's criticisms are completely baseless, but they are received with an attention and respect that Popper's "intrinsic worth hardly merits". The philosopher John Gray writes in Straw Dogs that Popper's account of scientific method would have prevented the theories of Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein from being accepted.

Selz never published his ideas, partly because of the rise of Nazism , which forced him to quit his work in and prohibited any reference to his ideas. Popper, the historian of ideas and his scholarship, is criticised in some academic quarters for his rejection of Plato, Hegel and Marx. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Vienna , Austria-Hungary. London , England , UK. Epistemology Rationality Philosophy of science Logic Social and political philosophy Metaphysics Philosophy of mind Origin of life Interpretations of quantum mechanics. Main article: Critical rationalism. Main article: Paradox of tolerance.

Main article: Popper's three worlds. This section may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. Please consider splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding subheadings. January Age of Enlightenment List of liberal theorists contributions to liberal theory. Schools of thought. Regional variants. Related topics. Bias in academia Bias in the media. Edited by Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner, this volume contains a large number of Popper's previously unpublished or uncollected writings on political and social themes.

Philosophy of science portal Liberalism portal. Calculus of predispositions Contributions to liberal theory Critique of psychoanalysis Evolutionary epistemology Liberalism in Austria Popper legend Positivism dispute Predispositioning theory Poper Scientific Stand up. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Zalta, Edward N. Karl Popper Winter ed. Cambridge University Press. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 2nd ed.

From Physics to Metaphysics. Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press. Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society. Fifty Major Political Thinkers. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Retrieved January Popper — The Intellectual Warrior". Scientific American. Bibcode : SciAm. Bartley Section IX. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, The Story of Philosophy. New York: DK Publishing , Archived from the original on 10 June Retrieved 21 December Popper [] Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography , p. The Great Philosophers London: Phoenix, p.

Neue Folge Band 18 , S. Philosopher of 'Open Society ' ". The New York Times. Retrieved 15 November Sir Karl Popper, a philosopher who was a defender of democratic systems of government, died today in a hospital here. He was He died of complications of cancer, pneumonia and kidney failure, said a manager at the hospital in this London suburb. Retrieved 12 August Retrieved 1 December Inamori Foundation.

Archived from the original on 23 May Retrieved 9 June Miller Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Karl Popper. The Formative Years. Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? The myth of the framework: in defence of science and rationality. Editor:Mark Amadeus Notturno.

Retrieved 26 April Retrieved 25 April — via Internet Archive. City University of Hong Kong. All Life is Problem Solving. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography , pp. The Guardian. Retrieved 22 February Retrieved 26 May Editions du Seuil, Paris. Retrieved 18 October Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, Keuth: The philosophy of Karl Popper , section See also John Watkins: Popper and Darwinism.

Primary sources are, in particular, Objective Knowledge: An evolutionary approach , section "Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge"; Evolutionary epistemology Eds. Radnitzsky, W. Bartley , section "Natural selection and the emergence of mind"; In search of a better world , section "Knowledge and the shaping of rationality: the search for a better world", p. Eccles , sections "The biological approach to human knowledge and intelligence" and "The biological function of conscious and intelligent activity".

Miller: Karl Popper, a scientific memoir. Out of Error , p. The Hopeful Behavioural Monster" p.


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    Karl R. Bibliographie — Wissenschaftstheorie, Sozialphilosophie, Logik, Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, Naturwissenschaften. Schriftenreihe der Karl Popper Foundation Klagenfurt. Current edition Gattei, Stefano. Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science. Miller, David. Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence. David Miller Ed.